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COMMENTS
EMPLOYEE VACATION PAY REGULATION UNDER THE
EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974
Joe works for a company that has a policy providing that em-
ployees are eligible for a three week paid vacation after they have
reached the anniversary date of their fifth year. After continuously
working for this company for four and one-half years, he is termi-
nated from his employment for unspecified reasons. Joe, who had
full notice of his employer's vacation pay policy, is denied his request
for pro rata vacation benefits. Since he did not meet the clearly stated
condition precedent of five years employment, Joe does not have a
valid legal cause of action to enforce this claim.
Legislators in the state in which Joe lives and works have be-
come concerned that Joe and many others are having to forfeit
earned benefits because of strict conditions precedent which are at-
tached to fringe benefit plans. In an effort to address this concern,
the state legislature passes a law providing that all vested' vacation
pay must be paid at the date of an employee's termination. The state
supreme court then interprets "vested" to mean "earned at the time
the labor is rendered." Thus, pro rata vacation benefits must be paid
to an employee regardless of the employer's policy. The federal gov-
ernment and employers throughout the state challenge this state's
authority to enact such a law. Does this state have the authority to
require that vacation benefits vest as they are earned?
I. INTRODUCTION
State power to regulate in the field of employee benefit plans
has been severely limited by the enactment of the Employee Retire-
© 1984 by Melanie Caron Gold.
1. Vested interest is defined as a "present right or title to a thing, which carries with it
an existing right of alienation, even though the right to possession or enjoyment may be post-
poned to some uncertain time in the future." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1735 (5th ed. 1979).
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ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),2 a complex federal reg-
ulatory scheme governing employee pension 3 and welfare4  plans.
Hailed as landmark social legislation representing the "greatest de-
velopment in the life of the American worker since social security,"'
the Act was "designed to protect interstate commerce, federal taxing
power, and the interests of participants in private employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries." 6 To eliminate state interference with
the accomplishment of these goals, Congress included a sweeping
preemption provision providing that all state laws are superseded
"insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan."' 7 For pur-
poses of this preemption section, ERISA defines state law to include
"all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having
the effect of law."'
Since ERISA affects many areas traditionally governed by state
law, significant questions are raised concerning the extent to which
states may continue to regulate various types of benefit plans. In fact,
employer vacation plans constitute one such type of arrangement in
which states have shown concern for protecting the rights of employ-
ers and employees. Almost all employment agreements today provide
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1, § 88
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of titles 15, 18, 19, 26, 29, 31, 42 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter cited as ERISA]. ERISA was enacted pursuant to congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce under the commerce clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 29 U.S.C. §
1001(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). In order to avoid confusion, section numbers used in the text
will be those of ERISA rather than those of Title 29 U.S.C. Each section will be footnoted to
29 U.S.C. the first time it is mentioned.
3. Pension plans provide deferred income upon retirement and commonly take the form
of retirement, profit sharing, thrift and savings, and qualified stock bonus plans. See generally
J. MAMORSKY, EMPLOYEE BENEfiTS LAW (1981).
4. A welfare plan typically provides benefits such as medical, hospitalization, and disa-
bility coverage. These plans can also provide vacation benefits, dental coverage, and group
legal services. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
5. 120 CONG. REC. 29.993 (1974) (remarks of Senator Javits). There was a long legis-
lative history leading to the enactment of ERISA. Government study of the employee benefit
field began in 1962 when President Kennedy appointed a special task force to study the effects
of the loss of employee benefits. Id. at 29.934. It was not until 1967 that reform legislation was
first introduced in Congress. § 1103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 4647 (1967).
ERISA was signed into law by President Ford on Labor Day in 1974. For a background and
history of ERISA's enactment see Hutchinson & Ifshin, Federal Preemption of State Law
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 46 U. CHt. L. REV. 23, 23-34
(1978-1979); Brummond, Federal Preemption of State Insurance Regulation Under ERISA,
62 IOWA L. REV. 57, 59-61 (1976-1977); Comment, The Employee Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974: Policies and Problems 26 SYRACUSE L. REV., 539, 541-49 (1975).
6. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff d per
curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
7. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1976).
8. Id. § 514(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c) (1976).
ERISA
for some form of a paid vacation, accounting for nearly five percent
of payroll costs for the average employer.' Notwithstanding the im-
portance of employee vacation benefits, both in terms of deferred
compensation to employees and in terms of costs to employers, rela-
tively few cases involving vacation benefits reach the courts. This is
due to the fact that most of the issues raised in this area are a matter
of contract interpretation and are settled in arbitration 0 or adminis-
trative"1 contexts.
In 1982, however, the issue of vacation pay was addressed by
the California Supreme Court in the case of Suastez v. Plastic
Dress-Up Co."2 The particular question before the court involved the
interpretation of the term "vested time" within the meaning of Cali-
fornia Labor Code section 227.3." In Suastez, the court held that an
employee's proportionate right to a paid vacation vests as the labor is
rendered. 4 Once the paid vacation vests, this right is protected from
forfeiture by Labor Code section 227.3. The court rejected the argu-
ment that vesting is determined solely by looking at the terms of the
employment contract or employer policy.' 5 Thus, regardless of the
reason for which an employee is terminated, an employee is fully
entitled to a pro rata share of his or her vacation pay.
There is little doubt that the vesting requirements mandated by
Suastez will significantly affect the rights and obligations of employ-
ers and employees in relation to an ERISA type of employee benefit
plan.' Since Suastez prohibits employers from enforcing any condi-
9. Lindsey, Employe Benefits, Then & Now, Nation's Bus. Aug. 1981, at 62, 64 therein-
after cited as Then & Now]. In 1979, the average employer spent $15.54 weekly per employee
on paid vacations. Lindsey, Employe Benefits' Bigger Bite, Nation's Bus. Dec. 1981, at 75, 75
[hereinafter cited as Bigger Bite]. Other large fringe benefit cost items were old age, survivors,
disability and health insurance; non-governmental pensions; and life, hospital, medical, and
surgical benefits. Id. The trend toward employer provided vacations began in the 1940's when
the National War Labor Board adopted a policy of approving or ordering paid vacations in
lieu of direct increases in wage rates. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 348, 351-52 (1953).
10. Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 348, 352 (1953). See also Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, Inc., 56
Cal. 2d 169, 189, 363 P.2d 313, 324, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 308 (1961).
11. For example, in California the Division of Labor Law Enforcement has the author-
ity to settle disputes and enforce rights relating to vacation pay agreements. CAL. LAB. CODE §
217 (West 1971).
12. 31 Cal. 3d 774, 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
13. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1983). Section 227.3 states that "an employ-
ment contract or employer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested vacation time upon
termination." For an extensive analysis of this statute see SIMMONS & SMITH, WAGE AND
HOUR MANUAL FOR CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS, 283-96 (1982).
14. 31 Cal. 3d at 784, 647 P.2d at 128, 183 Cal. Rptr at 852.
15. Id. at 781, 647 P.2d at 126, 183 Cal. Rptr at 849.
16. In light of the potential conflict between ERISA and the Suastez decision several
large employer associations have filed a complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory
1984]
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tions precedent to the receipt of vacation pay, the decision will have
a large impact on employer costs associated with providing vacation
benefits. 7 In addition, the Labor Commissioner has announced that
the decision will have a retroactive effect."8 Consequently, huge sums
of unanticipated monetary obligations will be imposed upon Califor-
nia employers. Many employers may further decide to drop vacation
policies entirely or to severely limit them to certain kinds of employ-
ees. The Suastez case also raises concerns about whether the ruling
will be extended to other types of employee benefits.
In the face of ERISA and its broad preemption provision, this
comment analyzes whether a state has the authority to regulate the
vesting of vacation pay. Discussion begins with an overview of
ERISA's statutory scheme and a review of the litigation surrounding
its preemption clause. Next, an examination of the Suastez decision,
which is representative of a minority, yet growing view of the nature
of vacation pay, demonstrates that it was based on sound legal analy-
sis. This comment offers two potential grounds for finding that a
state vacation benefit vesting regulation, such as that embodied in the
Suastez decision, is not preempted by federal law. First, it can be
argued that vacation plans are not "employee benefit plans" within
the meaning of ERISA and, therefore, are not affected by the Act.
Secondly, it can be argued that state vacation pay vesting require-
ments fall outside the scope of ERISA's preemptive language. Al-
though these arguments contain some validity, this comment con-
cludes that a better approach would be to uphold the Suastez
decision based on federal common law.
II. ERISA
A. General Statutory Scheme
ERISA is an extremely complex regulatory scheme representing
the most comprehensive reform of private employee benefit systems
to date. Prior to ERISA's enactment, there was a phenomenal ex-
pansion in the size and scope of private employee benefit plans", re-
relief that the Suastez decision be declared preempted and superseded by ERISA. California
Hosp. Assoc. v. Henning, 96 Lab. Cas. (CCH) D 55, 384 (1983) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
17. See also L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Nov. 5, 1982 at 1, col. 4 "Business groups estimate
the ruling could cost California industry more than $1 billion a year. One major retailer
predicts it will spend $800,000 a year filing claims." Id.
18. See id.
19. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4639, 4641 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 533].
[Vol. 24
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suiting from wartime wage stabilization programs coupled with
favorable tax rules that encouraged fringe benefits as a substitute for
wage increases.2" This rapid growth of benefit plans,2 unchecked by
effective state or federal regulation, resulted in widespread funding22
and disclosure 2  abuses and led to massive forfeiture of benefits.24
ERISA was a product of a concentrated congressional effort to curb
the inequities associated with these benefit plans. The Act's purpose
was essentially twofold. First, the Act sought to protect the expecta-
tions of the American worker 25 by ensuring that private plans had
adequate minimum standards and safeguards for guaranteeing the
payment of promised benefits. Secondly, the Act sought to encourage
the growth and development of voluntary private employer financed
benefit plans."
To ensure that the first objective, protecting employee rights,
In the past three decades, the percentage of total payroll costs attributable to fringe bene-
fits have doubled. Then & Now, supra note 9, at 62. In 1979 these benefits accounted for
36.6% of total payroll costs; whereas thirty years ago the average company paid only 18.7% in
fringe benefits. Id. "Nationally, benefits for . . . government and private-sector workers ran
$390 billion in 1979, up from $26 billion in 1951." Id. at 62. Today, the average private
sector worker receives nearly $400 a month in fringe benefits. WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan.
9, 1979 at 1, col. 5. For a report tracing trends in fringe benefits by type of benefit, type of
industry and by region, see U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 6460, 1951-1979, EM-
PLOYEE BENEfiTS HISTORICAL DATA 1951-1970 (1980).
20. See Comment, supra note 5, at 543. Other factors generating growth of pension and
welfare plans included the New Deal's emphasis on social welfare programs and the enact-
ment of various federal labor-management statutes. Turza & Holloway, Preemption of State
Laws Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 163,
170 n.36 (1978-1979). For a history of the growth of employee pension and welfare funds, see
generally Chadwick & Foster, Federal Regulation of Retirement Plans: The Quest For Par-
ity, 28 VAND. L. REV. 641, 642-68 (1975); Negotiated Employee Benefit Plans, 8 N.B.P.C.
(Callaghan) ch. 1 (1971).
21. ERISA § 2(a); 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976). For an analysis of federal and state
regulation of employee benefit plans before ERISA, see Turza & Holloway, supra note 20, at
169-74.
22. Funding "refers to the accumulation of sufficient assets in a [benefit] plan to assure
the availability of funds for payment of benefits due to the employees when such obligations
arise." H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 19, at 4643.
23. Before ERISA's enactment the average participant of an employee benefit plan did
not have access to the plan provisions. The few who were able to obtain access to such provi-
sions were unable to "comprehend them because of the technicalities and complexities of the
language used." Id. at 4646.
24. This forfeiture problem was dramatically illustrated in a highly publicized case in-
volving an Indiana Studebaker plant closing. The company's pension plan was terminated
resulting in more than 4,000 plan participants loosing $14 million or 85% of the current value
of their vested benefits. See Chadwick & Foster, supra note 20, at 668-69.
25. Comment, supra note 5, at 555. See also H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 19, at
4643.
26. H.R. REP. No. 533, supra note 19, at 4640. See Comment supra note 5, at 555-57.
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was met, Congress established detailed regulatory standards to gov-
ern employee benefit plans. These substantive provisions are con-
tained in Title I of the Act.27 Title I is divided into five parts, each
part addressing a specific aspect of the regulatory program. Part 1
establishes detailed reporting and disclosure standards, such as re-
quiring plan administrators to furnish a detailed plan description
and annual report to employees, beneficiaries, and the Secretary of
Labor.28 Part 2 sets forth strict participation and vesting require-
ments. 29 The participation standards generally require plans to in-
clude any employee who is twenty-five years of age and who has
completed one year of service.30 /
Alternative vesting scheduleg are also provided to ensure that
employees do not lose their expected benefits.3" Part 3 establishes
minimum funding standards,8 2 which are further supported by plan
termination insurance required under Title IV."3 Part 4 of Title I
governs the fiduciary standards for plan administrators, requiring
27. Title I contains the regulatory standards for employee benefit plans. 29 U.S.C. §§
1001-1145 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Title II contains tax provisions as amendments to the IRS
Code of 1954. 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-418E (1976 & Supp IV 1981). For a discussion of the tax
provisions of ERISA, see generally 33 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX 413-599 (1975); Pension Re-
form: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974-A Panel Discussion, So. CAL.
TAX INST. 691 (1975). Title III establishes provisions related to jurisdiction, administration,
and enforcement of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1242 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Jurisdiction for
ERISA's enforcement is divided between the Department of Labor and the Department of
Treasury. See ERISA § 3004, 29 U.S.C. § 1204 (1976). Title IV creates the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation and establishes a system of employee plan termination insurance, in-
cluding special provisions for multi-employer plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1461 (1976 & Supp. V
1981). For a more detailed discussion of these other titles see Chadwick & Foster, supra note
20, at 677-708; Comment, supra note 5, at 549-54.
28. ERISA §§ 101-111; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). These plan
descriptions must be drafted so they can be understood by the average plan participant. Id. at
102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Brummond, supra note 5, at
61-62; Comment, supra note 5, at 660-67.
29. ERISA §§ 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
30. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (a)(1)(A) (1976).
31. The Act provides three alternative vesting formulas. The first possibility allows for a
graded schedule under which the participant becomes 25% vested after five years and receives
an additional 5% interest for each of the next five years and an additional 10% for each of the
remaining five years. Id. § 203(a)(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B) (1976). The next alterna-
tive establishes a vesting schedule which allows the participant to become fully vested after 10
years of service. Id. § 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(A) (1976). The third possibility,
the "rule of 45", allows a worker with at least 5 years of service to become 50% vested when
the sum of his age and years of service equals 45, after which an additional 10% must become
vested for each of the next five years. Id. § 203(a)(2)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(C) (1976).
For a detailed explanation of these elaborate vesting provisions, see Comment, supra note 5,
571-83. See also Brummond, supra note 5, at 62.
32. ERISA §§ 301-402; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1102 (1976).
33. Id. §§ 4022, 4023; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1323 (1976).
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strict standards of conduct for plan trustees.3 4 Part 5 of Title I con-
tains a broad administrative and enforcement section, 5 which estab-
lishes civil and criminal penalties for violation of the Act and gives
the Secretary of Labor broad investigatory and regulatory powers.36
These substantive regulations contained in Title I cover two
types of employee benefit plans-employee pension plans3 7 and em-
ployee welfare benefit plans.38 Pension plans were the main subject
of congressional concern and are the primary focus of the statutory
scheme.3 9 These plans are subject to all of the provisions established
in Title I. Unlike pension plans, welfare benefit plans received little
attention in ERISA's legislative history and are exempt from many
of the Act's substantive requirements. These plans are not required
to conform to the vesting, participation, or funding requirements es-
tablished in parts 2 and 3 of Title 1.4' Because such plans remain
subject only to the disclosure, fiduciary, and administration sections,
this has resulted in a large regulatory vacuum for welfare benefit
plans.4
34. Id. §§ 401-414; 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1976). The fiduciary standards require
trustees to act solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries, id. § 403(C)(1) (1976), and establish
a list of prohibited transactions, id. § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1976). Hutchinson & Ifshin,
supra note 5, at 32-33; Brummond, supra note 5, at 63; Comment, supra note 5, at 642-58.
35. ERISA §§ 501-514, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1144 (1976).
36. Id. §§ 501, 502, 504-506, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131, 1132, 1134-1136 (1976).
37. ERISA defines an employee pension plan as:
any plan fund or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or by
an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express terms or
as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program -
(A) provides retirement income to employees, or
(B) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to
the termination of covered employment or beyond,
regardless of the method of calculating the contributions made to the plan, the
method of calculating the benefits under the plan or the method of distributing
benefits from the plan.
ERISA § 3(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2) (1976).
38. ERISA defines an employee welfare benefit plan as:
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or other-
wise, (A) medical, surgical, . . . accident, disability, death, or unemployment, or
vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any benefit described in sec-
tion 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (other than pensions
on retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).
Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1976).
39. Id. § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 1001; Comment, supra note 5, at 549.
40. Brummond, supra note 5, at 117.
41. See infra text accompanying note 126. See also Brummond, supra note 5, at 118-20;
1984]
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B. ERISA's Preemption Provision
To meet ERISA's second objective, encouraging the growth of
benefit plans, Title I also contains section 514,42 a sweeping preemp-
tion clause which prohibits states from enacting any laws which "re-
late to" employee benefit plans. In choosing to retain a voluntary
system, Congress was aware of the need to limit the cost of private
plans in order to encourage employers to maintain or increase the
level of employee fringe benefits. ERISA's provisions were carefully
designed to provide enough protection to employees while not over-
burdening employers with costly regulations.4 Section 514 was in-
cluded in ERISA to foreclose the possibility that benefit plans would
be subject to additional conflicting and inconsistent state and local
laws.44 Congress further sought to protect multi-state plans from the
administrative expense of complying with numerous state re-
quirements.
Congress also included this sweeping preemption provision to
prevent the possibility of endless litigation which would arise under
a more specific provision."' This goal, however, has not been met.
Since 1974, there has been a flood of litigation concerning the scope
of ERISA's intrusion upon state law.46 In defining the scope of pre-
Note, infra note 88, at 463-67.
42. The key provisions of section 514 are as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
title and title IV shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 4(a) and
not exempt under section 4(b). This section shall take effect on January 1,
1975.
(c)(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or
any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
title.
ERISA § 514; 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
43. H.R. Rep. No. 533, supra note 19, at 4643-44.
44. 120 Cong. Rec. 29,933 (1974) (remarks of Senator Williams).
45. Id. at 29,942 (remarks of Senator Javits).
46. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested that "Congress has blown up a
dam" by preempting state law in the enactment of ERISA. Alvares v. Erickson, 514 F.2d 156,
161 (9th Cir. 1975) (dictum), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874 (1975).
The § 514 issue has been raised most often in relation to state laws concerning insurance,
domestic relations, and civil rights. Insurance, see, e.g., Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70
(1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978); Insurer's Action Council, Inc. v. Heaton,
423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976); Hewlett Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D.
Cal. 1977), affd per curiam, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831
(1978). Domestic relations, see, e.g., AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979);
Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Francis v.
1984] ERISA
emption under section 514, courts have articulated at least four dis-
tinct theories:"' the plain meaning theory, 48 the legislative purpose
theory,49 the proximity theory,50 and the specific conflict theory."'
The scope of preemption associated with each theory ranges from
very broad under the plain meaning theory to very narrow under the
specific conflict theory. In 1981, the Supreme Court faced the issue
of ERISA preemption for the first time and noted the conflicting
decisions, but declined to indicate the outer limits of preemption. 52
The uncertainty surrounding the language of section 514 de-
rives from the very nature of preemption provisions, which com-
monly raise difficult interpretation problems.5" Generally, congres-
sional exercise of a granted power may supersede a state law if the
state law directly conflicts with federal regulation or if federal law
"occupies the field." 5 Since a federal law rarely supersedes an entire
United Techs. Corp., 458 F.Supp 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Civil rights, see, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie
Co. v. Department of Indus., 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979); Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441,585 P.2d 12 (1978); Pervel Indus. Inc. v. Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportu-
nities, 468 F. Supp. 490 (D. Conn. 1978), affd, 603 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1979). The courts have
also addressed the issue of the scope of § 514 in other contexts such as debtor-creditor rela-
tions, taxation, worker's compensation, professional licensing, and restitution. Comment, supra
note 26, 145-46.
47. For a general discussion of these varying theories, see Comment, supra note 26, at
151-53.
48. The plain meaning theory adopts a narrow, literal, and unqualified approach to
determining the scope of § 514. For a case advancing this theory, see, e.g., National Carriers'
Conf. Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978).
49. The legislative purpose theory focuses on the relationship between the state law and
ERISA rather than on the relationship between the state law and the benefit plan. Several
versions of the theory have been espoused in recent cases. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Dept.
of Indus., 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
50. Courts adopting the proximity theory assert that the scope of ERISA's coverage
excludes state laws which have only an indirect relationship with an employee benefit plan.
See e.g., AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal.
App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1978).
51. Under the specific conflict theory a state law is preempted only when the state law
either duplicates or conflicts with specific provisions of ERISA. See, e.g., Insurer's Action
Council v. Heaton, 423 F. Supp. 921 (D. Minn. 1976); In re Marriage of Pardee, 408 F.
Supp. 666 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978). But see
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 451 U.S. 504 (1981). The Alessi Court expressly rejected this
theory as it was applied to the facts of that case. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
52. Alessi, 451 U.S. at FFF; 101 S. Ct. at 1907 n.21. Note, ERISA Permits Offsets of
Private Pension Benefits by Amounts Received in Worker's Compensation Awards, Preempt-
ing State Laws Prohibiting Such Offsets, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 457, 474 (1982)
53. Brummond, supra note 5, at 67. See also Note, A Framework for Preemption Anal-
ysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 363 (1978).
54. This is based on the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 127-34 (9th ed. 1975). It is beyond the scope of this comment to fully discuss the preemption
doctrine. See generally Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shiting Perspectives on Federalism
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field of law," the Supreme Court has attempted to develop standards
to determine when a particular law has been preempted.56 However,
these decisions have taken on an "ad hoc quality seemingly bereft of
any consistent, doctrinal basis."5
Despite the lack of analytical standards, there are two overrid-
ing principles governing the interpretation of preemption provisions.
First, a court's attitude towards federalism has historically been a
key factor in judicial preemption analysis." Recently, there has been
a very strong presumption in favor of state law, especially in areas in
which states have historically played an important role and have
continuing responsibilities."9 Secondly, it is generally agreed that the
ultimate question is one of legislative and statutory intent to preempt
state laws.60 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the importance
of clear congressional intent to preempt a state law in light of the
strong presumption in favor of state laws:
The exercise of federalism is not lightly presumed. . . .Pre-
emption of state law by federal statute or regulation is not fa-
vored in the absence of persuasive reasons- either that the na-
ture of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion
or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained.6"
In fact, ERISA's preemption provision is unique because of the
and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623 (1975); Hirsch, Toward a New View of
Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515 (1972).
55. The mere existence of federal activity will not eliminate all state functions in that
area. "Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature .... Congress . . .acts against the
background of the total corpusjuris of the states in much the way that a state legislature acts
against the background of the common law, assumed to govern unless changed by legislation."
P. BATOR, P. MIsHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330, 470-71 (2d. ed. 1973).
56. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
57. Note, supra note 54, at 624.
58. Id. at 623. See also Comment, Regulation of Employee Welfare Benefit Plans: The
Scope of ERISA's Preemption and State Power to Regulate Insurance, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV.
177, 193 (1979). The approach, however, has been criticized as constitutionally impermissible:
"The approach taken by the Court . . .alters . . . the literal and traditional reading of the
supremacy clause. The proper judicial inquiry should be accomplished through statutory con-
struction aided by legislative history, not by a balancing of competing federal and state policy
objectives." Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 38.
59. It has been suggested that the growing tendency to emphasize the interests of states
in preemption analysis may, in part, be explained by the present Supreme Court's generally
restrained view of federal power. See Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal
Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 307-09 (1977).
60. Note, Federal Preemption of State Laws: The Effect of Regulatory Agency Attitudes
on Judicial Decision Making, 50 IND. L.J. 848, 852-53 (1975).
61. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981) (quoting Florida
Lime and Avocado Growers v. Paul 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963)).
[Vol. 24
ERISA
strong evidence in its language and its legislative history showing
"unmistakable" congressional intent to displace state law. 2 This in-
tent is demonstrated by the sweeping language of the statute which is
tempered only by specific limiting exceptions.63 Since Congress ex-
pressly provided for these exceptions, it can be reasonably inferred
that it intended no others." Legislative history further makes it clear
that Congress devoted considerable attention to the question of pre-
emption and that it purposely intended a different policy towards
state laws than was previously embodied in the old Welfare and
Pension Disclosure Act of 1958,65 which recognized and preserved
state authority to regulate pension plans.66 Balancing the arguments
for broad preemption67 against the danger that such broad preemp-
tion might lead to unforeseen problems, Congress chose not to limit
the scope of preemption, but instead to entrust the task of recom-
mending new legislation to a watchdog body.6 8 Four years after the
enactment of ERISA, the task force reaffirmed the need for contin-
ued broad preemption:
Based on our examination of the effects of [section] 514, it is
our judgment that the legislative scheme of ERISA is suffi-
ciently broad to leave no room for state regulation within the
field preempted . . . the Federal interest and the need for na-
62. See, e.g., Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1215 (8th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 968, 102 S. Ct. 512 (1981); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Kramarsky,
666 F.2d 21, 23 (2d Cir. 1981); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388,
390-91 (1981). For a detailed discussion of ERISA's legislative history showing this broad
preemptive intent, see Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
affd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978).
63. ERISA § 514(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1144 provides that ERISA's preemption provision
does not apply to: (1) causes of action arising before Jan. 1, 1975; (2) other federal laws; (3)
any generally applicable criminal law of a state; and (4) state regulation of insurance, banking
or securities.
64. This maxim is expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Comment, supra note 26, at
151 n.39.
65. Welfare & Pension Plan Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958)
(amended by Act of March 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35).
66. Malone v. White Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 512 (1978) (plurality opinion). See Alessi,
451 U.S. at 522.
67. The reasons for broad preemption have been stated as: (1) the need to prevent con-
flicting regulation over interstate plans; (2) the desire to avoid the litigation which would result
from a narrower provision; (3) the emergence of a pervasive federal interest in employee bene-
fit plans; (4) the existence of a comprehensive federal program for further study. Department
of Labor ERISA Advisory Opinion No. 78-3A (1978).
68. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1222 (1982). These sections provide for the formation of a Joint
Pension Task Force which is to report to Congress on the implementation of ERISA. One of
the matters to be studied by the task force was the effect of federal preemption on state law.
But see Turza & Halloway, supra note 20, at 223 (asserting that such a body is an inappro-
priate group to make an effective study of the preemption problem).
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tional uniformity are so great that enforcement of state regula-
tion should be precluded.69
III. SUASTEZ V. PLASTIC DRESS-UP
In 1982, the California Supreme Court decided a case involving
employee benefits in the form of vacation pay. In Suastez v. Plastic
Dress-Up Co.," the defendant employer maintained an ordinary va-
cation policy providing that each employee was entitled to one to
four weeks of paid vacation annually based on the employee's length
of employment. 71 The policy expressly limited eligibility for vacation
benefits to employees who were employed on their anniversary 
date 2
and expressly prohibited the payment of pro rata vacation pay.
73
Employees had full notice of the vacation policy and its restrictions.
74
The plaintiff employee was terminated before his anniversary date
and was refused a pro rata share of his benefits.75
Based on existing precedent, the court of appeal denied the
plaintiff's claim for pro rata vacation pay. 76 The court relied on a
line of California cases that held that the vesting of vacation pay
could be subject to conditions precedent which are determined solely
by looking at the terms of the employment contract or company pol-
icy.7 7 The plaintiff contended that these cases did not control since
69. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., OVERSIGHT RE-
PORT OF THE PENSION TASK FORCE 9 (Comm. Print 1977).
70. 31 Cal. 3d 774 , 647 P.2d 122, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1982).
71. Id. at 776, 647 P.2d at 123, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 776 n.2, 647 P.2d at 123 n.2, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 847 n.2.
74. Id. The vacation policy was orally communicated to the employees in English and
Spanish. The policy was also posted above the time clock and on the employees' bulletin board.
Id. at 776 n.1, 647 P.2d at 123 n.1, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 847 n.l.
75. Id. at 777, 647 P.2d at 123-24, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
76. 125 Cal. App. 3d 550, 178 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1981) (depublished by order of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court).
77. Id. at 550, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 14. See Div. of Labor Law Enf. v. Anaconda Copper
Mining Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 92, 291 P.2d 169 (1955); Div. of Labor Law Enf. v. Standard
Coil Products Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 919, 288 P.2d 637 (1955); Div. of Labor Law Enf.
v. Mayfair Markets, 102 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 943, 227 P.2d 463 (1951).
Notwithstanding this generally accepted rule, California courts have used various doc-
trines to uphold an employee's right to recover pro rata vacation pay when forfeiture appeared
to produce an inequitable result. See, e.g., Div. of Labor Law Enf. v. Ryan Aeronautical Co.,
106 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 833, 236 P.2d 236 (1951). In Ryan Aeronautical, the court construed
a contract provision as a promise rather than a condition precedent and allowed the employee
who was terminated only five days prior to completion of his first year to recover pro rata
vacation pay on a theory of substantial performance. But see Anaconda Copper Mining Co.
138 Cal. App. 2d 92, 291 P.2d 169 (employee who was employed for four years and eleven
months not qualified to receive vacation pay based on a policy requiring five years of service).
1984] ERISA
they were decided before enactment of section 227.3,78 which ex-
tended broad protection to an employee's right to his vested vacation
pay. The court rejected this argument and held that while section
227.3 prohibited forfeitures of vacation pay, it did not change the
existing rule that a determination of when the vesting occurred must
still be decided with reference to the employment contract.79  The
court supported this finding with the statutory language of section
227.3, which required that benefits be paid "in accordance with such
contract of employment or employer policy respecting eligibility of
time served."8
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal,
holding that "vested time" within the meaning of the Labor Code
section 227.3 is not defined by the employer policy or contract of
employment, but vests as the labor is rendered. 8 In support of this
position, the court reaffirmed the well-established principle that va-
cation pay is an alternative form of wages and is not to be regarded
as a gift or gratuity.82 The court went on to reject the view held by a
number of courts that regards vacation pay as an inducement for
future services, constituting an offer or reward for constant and con-
tinuous service.8 3 Instead, the court asserted that vacation pay is sim-
ply a form of deferred compensation. Under this concept, conditions
Doctrines of waiver and frustration of purpose and general equitable principles have also been
considered relevant to the granting of a claim for pro rata vacation pay. Posner v. Grunwald-
Marx, Inc., 56 Cal. 2d 169, 189, 363 P.2d 313, 325, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 309 (1961).
78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 227.3 (West Supp. 1984) provides that:
[wihenever a contract of employment or employer policy provides for paid vaca-
tions, and an employee is terminated without having taken off his vested vaca-
tion time, all vested vacation shall be paid to him as wages at his final rate in
accordance with such contract of employment or employer policy respecting eli-
gibility or time served; provided, however, that an employment contract or em-
ployer policy shall not provide for forfeiture of vested vacation time upon termi-
nation. The Labor Commissioner or a designated representative, in the
resolution of any dispute with regard to vested vacation time, shall apply the
principles of equity and fairness.
79. 125 Cal. App. 3d 550, 178 Cal. Rptr. 14.
80. See supra note 77.
81. 31 Cal. 3d at 784, 647 P.2d at 128, 183 Cal Rptr. at 852.
82. Id. at 779, 647 P.2d at 125, 183 Cal. Rptr at 849. The case most often cited for this
proposition is In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940), where it was stated
that "[v]acation with pay is in effect additional wages. It involves a reasonable arrangement to
secure the well being of employees and the continuance of harmonious relations between em-
ployer and employee." Id. at 432. See also Ryan Aeronautical Co., 106 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at
836. See generally R. Feinberg, Do Contract Rights Vest?, LABOR ARBITRATION & INDUS-
TRIAL CHANGE 193-97 (1963).
83. 31 Cal. 3d at 782, 647 P.2d 126-27, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 850-51. The court stated that
in adopting this view "[courts] merely interpreted the language of the agreements before them
. . . [relying] on what is now an outdated notion of the nature of vacation pay." Id.
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precedent cannot be allowed to defeat the claim to benefits, since
these benefits, like wages, have already been earned-the required
consideration has been paid and the employee is entitled to his quid
pro quo.84
Finding further support for its interpretation of "vested time"
in the language of section 227.3, the court stated that "[i]f the Legis-
lature had intended the contract to control the time of vesting, it
could easily have drafted that statute to compel such a result."
'8 5 The
court found that the statutory reference to the employer's policy or'
contract of employment concerned the amount of vacation pay an
employee was entitled and was not relevant to the issue of vesting.
Moreover, in the requirement that vacation pay disputes be settled
by applying "principles of equity and fairness,"8" the court found
evidence that the Legislature intended vesting to occur immediately.
The court's reasoning on the basis of statutory interpretation
appears to be weak. After a careful reading of the statutory lan-
guage, it is difficult to find immediate support for the court's asser-
tion that the Legislature intended immediate vesting of vacation ben-
efits. Nor is there any relevant legislative history to assist the court
in overturning the well-established rule that the employer's policy
controls the time at which vesting occurs.
Nevertheless, the court's decision is supported by its analogy of
vacation pay with earned wages. Although courts in many jurisdic-
tions similarly view vacation pay as an earned right, many of these
courts wrongfully allow express or implied conditions precedent to
defeat the payment of pro rata vacation pay.87 Special rules are ap-
plied depending on the reason for the employee's termination.88 The
California Supreme Court's view, however, appears to be the better
one. Once it is acknowledged that vacation pay is equivalent to
earned wages, no distinction should be made among these different
situations. A benefit that is already earned survives the expiration of
84. Id. at 779, 647 P.2d at 125, 183 Cal. Rptr at 849. See Feinberg, supra note 82, at
194.
85. 31 Cal. 3d at 783, 647 P.2d at 127, 183 Cal Rptr. at 851.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Treloar v. Steggeman, 333 Mich. 166, 52 N.W.2d 647 (1957). See also
Botany Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union, 50 N.J. Super. 327, 126 A.2d 389 (1957). Even
courts that have upheld the right to pro rata vacation pay struggle to base their decision on a
contractual provision. See, e.g., Schneider v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1972). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 351-62 (Supp. 1981).
88. Feinberg, supra note 82, at 196. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Duluth, M & I R.R., 225
Minn. 508, 31 N.W.2d 465 (1948) (right to vacation pay denied based on the fact that the
separation from the employment resulted from the acts of the employee). See generally Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d. 351-62 (Supp. 1981).
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a contractual agreement and negates the validity of any condition
precedent to its receipt.
IV. STATE'S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE VESTING REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR EMPLOYEE VACATION BENEFITS
The two most frequently litigated issues under the preemption
provision of ERISA concern the definition of an employee benefit
plan covered by ERISA and the scope of preemption coverage. These
issues arise when addressing the question of a state's authority to
mandate vesting requirements for employee vacation benefits.
A. Is a Vacation Plan an "Employee Benefit Plan?"
Before section 514 of ERISA can be said to preempt a state law
or an application of such law, the plan must be an "employee benefit
plan" within the meaning of ERISA. Although ERISA was enacted
over seven years ago, and the Department of Labor has issued regu-
lations clarifying the statutory definition of an "employee benefit
plan," the question of what constitutes a plan remains unclear. 89
This uncertainty can be attributed to the great variety of methods
which can be used to provide employees with deferred compensation
and the difficult distinctions required when classifying such arrange-
ments as employee benefit plans. The most difficult questions arise
when attempting to qualify an arrangement as a "plan, fund, or pro-
gram" within the meaning of the Act. This issue must be addressed
when determining whether vacation pay programs meet the statutory
definition of an employee benefit plan.
As defined by the Act, an employee benefit plan9" is a generic
term covering pension plans and welfare plans. Plans that provide
89. This uncertainty has been most apparent in regard to employer arrangements such
as multiple employer trusts, legal service plans, and insurance plans. For cases involving mul-
tiple employer trusts, see Wayne Chemical Inc. v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 426 F.
Supp. 316, modified, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977); Hamberlin v. VIP Ins. Trust, 434 F.
Supp. 1196 (D. Ariz. 1977); Bell v. Employee See. Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382 (D. Kan.
1977). See also Note, Multiple Employer Trusts, Preemption and ERISA: A Case for Federal
Regulation and a Proposal for Statutory Reform, 65 MINN. L. REV. 459 (1981). Cases in-
volving legal service plans have raised similar definitional problems. See Employee Legal Ser-
vice Plans: Conflicts Between Federal and State Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH
J. 787, 806-12 (1976). See generally Goodman & Stone, Exempt Compensation Arrangements
Under ERISA, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 445 (1979).
90. ERISA defines an employee benefit plan: " the term 'employee benefit plan' or
'plan' means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan
which is both an employee welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan."
ERISA § 3(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1982).
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vacation benefits are expressly included within the statutory defini-
tion of an employee welfare benefit plan:
any plan, fund, or program which was . . . established or
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or
by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program was
established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of in-
surance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment, or vacation benefits . . . ." (emphasis
added).
Notwithstanding this clear statutory language, the Department
of Labor has issued regulations designed to wholly exempt certain
types of vacation plans from Title I of the Act.92 These regulations
enumerate various payroll "practices" that do not qualify as ERISA
welfare benefit plans including:
Payment of compensation, out of the employer's general assets,
on account of periods of time during which the employee, al-
though physically and mentally able to perform his or her du-
ties and not absent for medical reasons .. .performs no duties;
for example:
(i) Payment of compensation while an employee is on va-
cation or absent on a holiday, including payment of premiums
to induce employees to take vacations at a time favorable to the
employer for business reasons ...9 (emphasis added).
Because section 514 only applies to employee benefit plans covered
by Title I, the effect of these regulations is to bring these employer
"practices" outside the scope of the general preemption provision.
The Department of Labor has interpreted these regulations to
exclude all unfunded plans, which are those that provide vacation
benefits through the general assets of the employer rather than
through a separate fund. At the time these regulations were promul-
gated, the reason for excluding these unfunded vacation plans from
ERISA coverage was that they were "more closely associated with
regular wages or salary, rather than benefits triggered by contingen-
cies such as hospitalization." 4 The Labor Department has consist-
ently applied this distinction between funded and unfunded vacation
91. Id. § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
92. 29 C.F.R. § 2510 (1976).
93. Id. § 2510.3-1(b)(3).




plans in its enforcement activities. For example, an examination of
the Department's Advisory Opinions95 shows that the determination
that a particular vacation scheme was an ERISA benefit plan rather
than a "payroll practice" each time has depended on a showing that
the benefit plan was separately funded, such as in the form of a
vacation trust. 6 Because the majority of vacation plans are funded
through an employer's general assets, these regulations have the ef-
fect of entirely excluding most vacation plans from ERISA coverage.
Although labor law authorities97 and one state court98 have ac-
quiesced in the Department of Labor's interpretations, these regula-
tions have not been subjected to detailed analysis. This can be attrib-
uted to the fact that an agency's consistent construction of its own
administrative regulation is generally respected by the courts.99 This
longstanding rule of administrative law, however, is limited when an
agency defines words which have already been defined within the
Act. The United States Supreme Court recently considered the stan-
dard used to review a regulation that operates to restrict a term de-
fined in a federal statute.' 00 The Court stated:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see
whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of
95. The Department of Labor ERISA Advisory Opinions are authorized by ERISA §
108, 29 U.S.C. § 1028, which provides that reliance on a written ruling of the Secretary
precludes criminal liability under the Act. ERISA Advisory Opinions will hereinafter be cited
as ERISA Ad. Op.
96. ERISA Ad. Op. No. 79-4A. See also ERISA Ad. Op. Nos. 82-56A, 82-44A, 81-
71A, 81-36A, 80-44A, 79-14A.
97. See, e.g., MAMORSKY, supra note 3, at § 10.02 (1982) ("the regulations specify a
number of practices and arrangements that provide benefits to employees that are not regarded
as employee benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA. They are (1) vacations .... ");
CALIF. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, ADVISING CALIFORNIA EMPLOYERS § 1.26,
23 (1981) ("[flunded vacation plans may be subject to ERISA .... ") (emphasis added);
RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA INC., EMPLOYEE BENEfiTS COMPLIANCE COORDINATOR,
Vol. 3, 1 18,403 (1982).
98. In Richardson v. St. Mary Hospital, 6 Kan. App. 2d 238, 627 P.2d 1143 (1981), a
state court of appeals held that a state vacation pay statute was not preempted by ERISA. Id.
at 243, 627 P.2d at 1146. Assuming arguendo that federal law did apply, the court interpreted
the Department of Labor regulations as excluding from the definition of an ERISA employee
benefit plan a vacation plan which was funded through the employer's general assets. It should
be noted, however, that the court relied solely on the face of the regulations and failed to
provide any analysis in its decision, and, furthermore, that the court's conclusion was dicta.
This case appears to be the only reported decision which has addressed the issue of whether
ERISA preempts a state's regulation of vacation benefits.
99. Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1944). See also Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1964).
100. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
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the statute, its origin, and its purpose.' Harmony between statu-
tory language and regulation is particularly significant in this
case. Congress itself defined the word at issue . . . and the
Commissioner interpreted Congress's definition only under his
general authority to 'prescribe all needful rules.' 26 U.S.C. §
7805(a). Because we therefore can measure the Commissioner's
interpretation against a specific provision in the Code, we owe
the interpretation less deference .... '0o
Thus, it becomes necessary to examine whether the Department
of Labor's interpretation of its regulation "harmonizes with the plain
language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose." In fact, the stat-
utory language of ERISA gives no indication that Congress intended
to exempt any form of formal vacation plan from Title I. Section
4(a) of ERISA provides that all employee benefit plans are covered
by Title I unless specifically excluded by section 4(b).1 °2 Section
4(b), in turn excludes from Title I five specific categories of plans,
none of which in any way relates to unfunded vacations plans.'
Because Congress provided these specific exceptions, this suggests
that it intended no other exceptions.'0 4
Further examination of the statute reveals that Congress was
aware of the distinction between funded and unfunded plans when it
enacted the statute and specifically distinguished between such plans
in those areas where it felt such a distinction was required. For ex-
ample, in section 4(b) Congress excluded unfunded excess benefit
plans from Title I, while retaining coverage of funded excess benefit
plans." 5 The act also provides that an unfunded plan maintained
primarily to provide retirement income for a select group of manage-
ment employees would not be required to conform to certain stan-
dards, such as vesting and funding requirements.10  Congress further
101. Id. at 253 (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472,
477 (1979)).
102. 29 U.S.C. § 1003 (1982).
103. ERISA § 4(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1975), exempts from ERISA coverage gov-
ernmental plans, church plans, plans maintained to comply with applicable workmen's coin-
pensation laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws, plans maintained
primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens, and unfunded excess benefit plans.
104. See supra note 64.
105. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(5). An excess benefit plan is defined as a plan maintained to
provide benefits for certain employees in excess of the statutory limitations on contributions
and benefits established by ERISA. ERISA § 3(36), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(36). The distinctions
between funded and unfunded excess benefit plans also appear in § 201(7), 29 U.S.C. §
1051(7).
106 See also ERISA §§ 201(2), 201(7), 301(a)(3), 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2),
1051(7), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1). For details of this unfunded exception, see Goodman &
Stone, supra note 88, at 459-65.
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limited Title I coverage to scholarship "funds." '1 7 Consistent with
this statutory language, the Department of Labor regulations ex-
clude scholarship programs paid through the employer's general as-
sets10 8 and point to the word "funds" as dispositive of this issue." 9
In contrast to these numerous distinctions, there is no mention any-
where in the legislative history of ERISA that Congress intended to
distinguish between funded and unfunded vacation plans.
A minority of courts have held that ERISA's definition of em-
ployee benefit plans includes only those plans in which assets are
held separately in trust type arrangements.1 0 This view finds sup-
port from the fact that the primary focus of congressional concern in
ERISA's legislative history was the accumulation and misappropria-
tion of assets characterized by an identifiable "fund" or "res. '' n l
However, this view is not supported by a majority of courts nor is it
supported by the Act. Courts have consistently applied section 514 to
preempt a state law regardless of whether the employee benefit plan
was funded through a trust, insurance, or a self-funded arrange-
ment."' The Department of Labor has similarly held that, in gen-
eral, an ERISA "plan" does not require any special type of
funding.'"
In fact, the overall structure and purpose of the Act reflects an
intent to define employee benefit plans as broadly as possible. It has
been noted that ERISA's definition of employee benefit plans closely
resembles a broad "decisional matrix or process."" 4 For example, an
employee benefit plan can come under ERISA's regulatory coverage
before any of its terms exist." 5 Moreover, ERISA "plans" are all-
encompassing concepts which include, but are not limited to, trust
funds, plan documents, insurance contracts, and funding procedures.
One court, noting that Congress intended such an inclusive definition
of an ERISA "plan," stated that Congress specifically chose broad
language when it referred to any plan, fund, or program and "was
107. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
108. 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1(k) (1981).
109. 40 Fed. Reg. 34,527 (1975).
110. See, e.g., Taggert Corp. v. Life & Health Benefits Admin., 617 F.2d 1208 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981).
111. Id. at 1211. See also H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4639, 4640.
112. See, e.g., Hewlett Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977),
affd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978) (holding ERISA pre-
empted the application of a state law to a self-funded medical plan).
113. ERISA Ad. Op. No. 76-66. See also ERISA Ad. Op. No. 75-128.
114. Note, supra note 89, at 483-85.
115. Id. at 484.
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fully aware of the functions and scope of employee benefit plans
... 5,116 A narrow definition of an ERISA employee benefit plan
would be inadvisable since it would constrain the flexibility pur-
posely built into the Act.
Because the clear language and purpose of the statute seems to
require that all formal vacation plans be covered by the Act, the
Department of Labor regulations, which exclude unfunded vacation
plans, should be entitled to little deference. In addition, there are
reasons why a court should not find a definition of employee benefit
plans conclusive on the issue of whether ERISA preempts the state
regulation of employee vacation plans. First, if the distinction be-
tween funded and unfunded plans is allowed to stand, only vacation
benefit plans which are separately funded would be included within
the definition of an ERISA "plan". Since only ERISA "plans" are
subject to the Act's preemption provision, this would create an ineq-
uitable situation, allowing some employers to escape the effect of
state law by taking the minor steps necessary to establish a self-
funded or trustee arrangement. An example of a separately funded
vacation scheme is a vacation trust fund,'1 7 which is typically estab-
lished by larger and more sophisticated employers in certain indus-
tries." 8 This would mean that these employers could completely
avoid the Suastez decision's vesting requirements. In contrast to the
strict state regulations which potentially could be imposed on un-
funded vacation plans, "funded" plans would operate in a regulatory
vacuum since most of ERISA's substantive standards do not apply to
such plans. Furthermore, difficult and numerous problems could po-
tentially arise in the determination of what constitutes a "funded"
plan.
Secondly, when a court bases it's decision regarding ERISA
116. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 78 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
980 (1978).
117. Recently, in Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Trust, 679 F.2d 1307
(9th Cir. 1982), the Ninth Circuit found that a vacation trust is an "employee benefit plan"
within the meaning of ERISA. Id. at 1309. The court went on to hold that the state's attempt
to levy on an employee vacation trust for fund taxes unpaid by the employee tax beneficiary
was preempted by ERISA. Id.
For a description of a typical vacation trust plan, see id. at 1308. See also Sulmeyer v.
Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1962).
118. Vacation trusts typically exist in industries such as construction and longshoring
where employees work for many employers during any single year and have long periods of
unemployment between jobs. In these industries it is usually unnecessary for employees to be
granted leave from any job in order to take a vacation. Brief of the American Federation of
Labor Congress of Industrial Organizations As Amicus Curiae at 21-3, California Hospital
Ass'n v. Henning, No. 32-6659 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 20, 1982).
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preemption on a simplistic interpretation of an "employee benefit
plan," it is not focusing on the important issue. In recent years,
courts have increasingly avoided determining ERISA's preemptive
scope by narrowly defining an ERISA "plan." '119 This approach has
been criticized because it circumvents a more fundamental question
concerning the balance of power between the federal and state gov-
ernments in ERISA's legislative scheme. The importance of deter-
mining the relative roles of the federal and state governments in the
regulation of fringe benefit plans demands that courts address this
basic issue. It is crucial to the states, employers, and employees, that
a clear understanding of the scope of federal power to govern em-
ployee benefit plans be arrived at in a principled manner.
B. Does a State Vacation Pay Regulation Fall Within the Scope of
ERISA's Preemption Provision?
The question of the scope of ERISA preemption of state law is
primarily a matter of determining legislative intent.120 Commenta-
tors and courts have generally agreed that the intent of Congress in
the area of pension and other employee benefits was that federal pre-
emption would be "virtually total."'' Notwithstanding this unusu-
ally strong showing of broad preemptive intent, the scope of
ERISA's preemption provision is not unlimited. The plain language
of the Act clearly states that section 514 displaces state law only
when enforcement "relates to" an ERISA plan. In addition, courts
have often been willing to narrowly construe the scope of section 514
in order to uphold state law. In part, these judicially created excep-
tions from the broad scope of section 514 are based on a "natural
tendency to restrict the scope of preemption where it appears to pro-
duce an inequitable result in a particular case." '22 These exceptions
further reflect a general judicial trend towards upholding state laws
when challenged on preemption grounds. But, these decisions also
stand on a more principled ground-that with a more careful inter-
pretation of congressional intent, the particular state law should
stand. Therefore, an attempt must be made to determine whether
there is evidence of legislative intent showing that a state vacation
pay vesting requirement falls outside the preemptive scope of
119. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 43-52.
120. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Bell v. Employee Security Benefit Ass'n, 437 F. Supp. 382, 387 (D.C.
Kansas 1977).
122. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 42. See also Okin, Preemption of State
Insurance Regulation by ERISA, 13 FORUM 652, 653-54 (1978).
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ERISA. The analysis depends upon the underlying theory regarding
the dimensions of ERISA's preemptive scope.
1. Narrow Reading of Section 514
There are several persuasive arguments demonstrating that
Congress did not intend to preempt such a state law. First, there is
no evidence in the entire history of ERISA to show that a state was
prohibited from regulating vested vacation pay. Nor is there any
clear evidence that Congress intended that the time at which welfare
benefits "vested" should be left for the employer to determine. In
fact, a careful look at ERISA's legislative history shows that the pre-
emption provision was hastily written, little understood, not exposed
to public debate, and comprised only a minor part of a complicated
reform measure.12 The present language of section 514 was inserted
by conference committee ten days before final action, after no con-
gressional hearings and with little explanatory comment." 4 In this
context it is unlikely that the consequences of preempting a decision
such as Suastez were contemplated. This evidence makes it difficult
to infer an unmistakable legislative intent to completely occupy the
field of employee benefit plans.
Secondly, under ERISA vacation plans are exempt from the
vesting, funding, and participation requirements established in Title
I. Thus, in order to find a congressional intent to preempt a state
vacation pay vesting regulation, it is necessary to find that Congress
intended to leave such plans almost entirely unregulated. Such a
finding is contrary to a primary objective of ERISA's legislative
scheme-the prevention of illusory benefits.' 2
The legislative history of ERISA is filled with examples of ben-
eficiaries of welfare benefit plans who had to forego promised bene-
fits because of inadequate vesting provisions.' 26 The facts of the
Suastez case illustrate that the problem of illusory benefits with re-
spect to vacation pay has not yet been resolved.' 2 7 Because of the
123. Furthermore, it has been noted that because the Conference Report came up for
congressional approval during the month of Richard Nixon's resignation, "tilt would be naive
to suppose that during this period any serious attention could have been devoted to such mat-
ters as the status of an obscure preemption provision in a 250-page federal statute." Brum-
mond, supra note 5, at 116.
124. Note, supra note 89, at 477.
125. Id.
126. In Suastez, the court noted that in one year 300 employees of the employer defen-
dant were terminated and each was denied the right to his or her share of pro rata vacation
benefits. 31 Cal. 3d 774, 776 n.4, 647 P.2d 122, 124 n.4, 183 Cal. Rptr. 846, 852 n.4 (1982).
127. See Brummond, supra note 5, at 118-20. See also Note, supra note 89, at 477.
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lack of any vesting requirements, ERISA's regulatory scheme does
not provide adequate protection that vacation benefits will not come
to represent false promises.
The term "regulatory vacuum" has been frequently used to de-
scribe the status of welfare benefit plans under ERISA."2 ' Many
courts have refused to find an explicit congressional intent to leave
these areas wholly unregulated. 29 In a particularly thoughtful opin-
ion, the court in Gast v. State rejected the plaintiffs argument by
stating:
[I]f we are to adopt the construction of [section 514] advanced
by the plaintiffs we must import to Congress not only an intent
to preempt state law, but also an intent to cease all governmen-
tal regulation, state or federal, other than the disclosure and
fiduciary requirements of health and welfare benefits paid by
employers or employee organizations. There is nothing in the
legislative history suggesting such an intent. To the contrary,
the legislative history indicates Congress was concerned with the
inadequacy of governmental regulations and concluded that
there should be at least minimum federal standards with respect
to disclosure and fiduciary responsibility.' 3 °
Furthermore, during oversight hearings, Senator Javits, a primary
sponsor of ERISA and supporter of the original broad preemption
provision, showed concern about the regulatory vacuum "which has
arisen in areas such as funding and vesting where ERISA sets no
substantive standards."''
128. See, e.g., Electrical Workers Local 1 v. IBEW-NECA Holiday Trust, 583 S.W.2d
154, 162 (Mo. 1979); Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978).
129. See, e.g., Gast v. State, 36 Or. App. 441, 585 P.2d 12 (1978).
130. Id. at 446, 585 P.2d at 22. Although this case represents a minority view, the
concerns it expresses have influenced other courts. Many of these courts state similar doubts
about the broad scope of § 514 but ultimately decide the issue on alternate grounds. Hutchin-
son & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 57-58.
131. SENATE COMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., OVERSIGHT OF
ERISA (1977). Senator Javits went on to state:
There are at least two ways of resolving the preemption problem involving wel-
fare benefit plans. The first is to provide for complementary State and Federal
jurisdiction by not preempting State statutes with additional standards for wel-
fare plans. The second is to extend ERISA's substantive standards, for example,
its funding requirements to welfare plans. The matter is very serious and should
be thoroughly reviewed by Congress.
Id. at 62.
However, it should be noted that this congressional concern has not been translated into
legislation. In 1980 Congress amended portions of ERISA to enact the Multiemployer Pension
Act of 1980. Pub. L. 96-364 Title IV §§ 402(a)(3), 403(b) Sept. 26, 1980. A Senate proposal
would have included a provision in the bill to limit the scope of ERISA's preemptive effect in
regard to certain types of welfare plans. This proposal, however, was rejected during Confer-
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In a similar argument, it is possible that Congress intended
such a broad preemption provision to apply to pension plans and not
to welfare plans. In fact, the legislative history demonstrates that
ERISA was primarily aimed at preventing abuses to private plan
systems and only a small segment of the lengthy testimony was de-
voted to problems relating to employee welfare plans.132 While pen-
sion plans are subject to minimum vesting and funding standards,
welfare plans-including vacation plans-have no analogous mini-
mum requirements. The difference is dramatic. While employers
must carefully provide minimum pension benefits under ERISA,
welfare benefits may be illusory.
2. Broad Reading of Section 514
A narrow reading of section 514 gives rise to convincing argu-
ments which show that Congress did not intend the scope of section
514 to broadly preempt a state law such as that embodied in Suas-
tez. However, an examination of the policies behind ERISA and a
proper regard for legislative intent seems to require that a court find
that a state lacks authority to impose substantive vesting require-
ments on vacation pay plans. The argument that a state law falls
outside the scope of ERISA's preemption provision if there is no di-
rect conflict with an ERISA regulation lacks validity because the
Act's clear language and legislative history show that its regulatory
scheme was intended to "occupy the entire field" of employee benefit
plans. Congress had purposely rejected a narrower provision which
would have limited the scope of preemption to state regulation of
areas expressly covered by the bill.138 During congressional debates
Senator Williams, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare emphasized that Congress intended to supersede all
state laws, even in areas in which ERISA provided no substantive
regulations:
It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified
in this bill, the substantive and enforcement provisions are in-
tended to preempt the field for Federal regulations, thus elimi-
ence Committee. See HOUSE CONF. REP. No. 96-1343, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ad. News at 298.
132. Brummond, supra note 5, at 115-16.
133. The original version of ERISA's preemption clause limited the scope of preemption
to state regulation of areas expressly covered by the bill. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
The Senate version similarly preempted state laws only insofar as they "related to subject
matters regulated by [the] Act." 120 CONG. REC. 5002 (1974). See Hewlett Packard Co. v.
Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1298-99 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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nating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and local
regulations of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended
to apply in its broadest sense to all actions of state and local
governments.'3 4
Moreover, in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 35 the most recent
Supreme Court case involving the question of ERISA preemption,
the Court expressly rejected the contention that section 514 is trig-
gered only when there is a specific conflict between a state law and
an ERISA provision. 36
Furthermore, allowing states to impose vacation pay vesting re-
quirements is counterproductive to several of ERISA's major policy
goals. Although the Suastez decision may be viewed as socially pro-
gressive because it appears to provide increased benefits and protect
against illusory benefits, it is probable that it will produce the oppo-
site result. Congress enacted ERISA to encourage employer adoption
of such employee benefit plans. Because vacation benefits are not
statutorily required, however, the added costs imposed by Suastez
may force employers to drop desired vacation benefits or to severely
restrict them to a select group of employees. This will have the most
adverse effect on low wage employees who can ill afford to lose these
benefits.
ERISA's goal of national uniformity will not be met if the
Suastez decision escapes the preemptive scope of section 514. Greater
costs associated with providing vacation benefits will be imposed on
California employers than on employers in other states due to the
decision's requirement of immediate vesting. In addition, if Suastez
is upheld over objections on preemption grounds, other states may
then enact their own elaborate vesting regulations which will result
in additional costs to multi-state employers who must then tailor
134. 120 CONG. REC. 32,430 (1974) (statement of Senator Williams).
135. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
136. 451 U.S. at 525. The issue in Alessi involved a New Jersey statute which prohib-
ited private pension benefits from offsetting worker's compensation awards. The district court
had denied the preemption challenge because it viewed ERISA's preemptive scope nar-
rowly-to supersede a state law only when that law directly interferes with or relates to an
ERISA pension plan. The Supreme Court expressly discredited this direct relationship re-
quirement and held the New Jersey law to be preempted. 451 U.S. at 526.
The Alessi decision, however, should be qualified in two respects. First, the case involved
an ERISA pension plan and not a welfare benefit plan. The Court declined to express its
views on several recent lower court decisions which had narrowed the scope of preemption in
relation to welfare benefit plans. 451 U.S. at 525 n.21. Secondly, the Court refused to adopt
the overly expansive view of the appellate court and was careful to note that under the present
case the dispositive issue was that there was a clear relationship between the state law prohibi-
tion and federal law permission. 451 U.S. at 525-26.
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their particular plans to each states vesting requirements. Thus, it is
clear that:
[In the final analysis, the victims of federal and multistate reg-
ulation of benefit plans are likely to be the employees them-
selves-the very persons intended to be benefited by plan regu-
lation. Faced with mounting costs, unwielding administration,
and vexatious litigation, at least some employers will undoubt-
edly terminate their employee welfare benefit plans .. .a re-
sult . . . not only . . . contrary to the best interests of employ-
ees but also [to the congressional] intent in adopting ERISA.13 7
A more fundamental reason for finding that a state vacation pay
regulation falls within ERISA's preemptive scope is a proper regard
for the power of the federal legislature to enact broad, carefully bal-
anced regulatory programs that leave no room for state action. In the
face of clear legislative intent to displace state laws, it is the role of
Congress, and not the judiciary to develop exceptions to the broad
scope of section 514. Although Congress has noted the existence of a
"regulatory vacuum" for welfare plans, it has shown an unwilling-
ness to limit the scope of the ERISA preemption clause."' 8 The re-
sult of judicial narrowing of section 514 on the basis of a court's
perceived notions of desirable public policy has resulted in doctrinal
confusion. By tinkering with ERISA's legislative program, "the po-
tential for mischief if not major disruption of Congress's regulatory
scheme should be apparent."1 9
V. UPHOLDING THE SUASTEZ DECISION BASED ON FEDERAL
COMMON LAW
Based on the foregoing preemption analysis, a court would be
required to invalidate the Suastez decision's interpretation of the
meaning of "vested" time. The result, however, does not appear to
be satisfactory. The Suastez decision was based on the California
Supreme Court's conception of vacation pay, which represents sound
legal analysis and the better view concerning the nature of a vested
benefit.
Despite the fact that ERISA preempts the Suastez decision, a
court is not required to end its analysis at that point. Instead, a bet-
ter approach would be to carry the analysis further and formulate
federal common law to govern the vesting of vacation benefits. The
137. Brummond, supra note 5, at 119.
138. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
139. Hutchinson & Ifshin, supra note 5, at 52.
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authority to create common law in this situation can be implied from
ERISA's legislative scheme. Since Congress rarely includes express
statutory language requiring a court to apply federal common law in
a particular situation, "a delegation of [such] lawmaking power gen-
erally occurs by implication.""'o4 The situation in which a court
should most readily find this implied power is when a state is pre-
empted from acting and the "court is forced to make law or leave a
void."' " This situation arises in the area of vacation benefits plans
since ERISA does not provide any substantive vesting requirements
governing such plans.
Further support for the power of the judiciary to formulate
common law governing the vesting of vacation benefits can be found
in specific statements in ERISA's legislative history. Speaking on be-
half of the conference version of ERISA, Senator Javits explained
that federal courts were empowered to create rules of law governing
aspects of the employee benefit field: "In view of Federal preemption
[i]t is also intended that a body of Federal substantive law will
be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans.""4 2 Several
courts have additionally affirmed judicial authority to formulate
rules to govern employee benefit plans, in the face of ERISA's broad
preemption provision.""
Once the power to apply federal law is established, a court must
then determine what that law should be. Generally, if there is a re-
lated statutory scheme, judicial common law must adhere to the poli-
cies underlying that legislative program."' Thus, in this case the
policies underlying ERISA must be the "guideposts in fashioning a
rule of decision.'
4 5
In fact, on one level the analysis used in the creation of a fed-
eral common law under ERISA greatly resembles the analysis used
140. Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1522 (1968).
141. Id.
142. 120 CONG. REC. 15,751 (1974).
143. See, e.g., Wayne Chemical v. Columbus Agency Service Corp., 426 F. Supp. 316
(N.D. Ind. 1977), aff d on other grounds, 567 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Riley v.
MEBA Pension Trust, 510 F.2d 406, 413 (2d Cir. 1977); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund,
441 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D.C. Pa. 1977), affid, 582 F.2d 1273 (1978). See generally Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327
F.2d 944, 951 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
144. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103-08 (1972). This principle is based on a
concern for enhancing Congress's role in establishing public policy. See Comment, Implied
Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Law Power,
51 U. COLO. L. REV. 355, 383 (1980).
145. Wayne Chemical, 426 F. Supp. at 322.
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in determining the extent of ERISA's preemptive scope-both must
focus on the legislative intent and underlying policies of ERISA. It
has been stated that there is often only "a thin line between the crea-
tion of federal common law and the interpretation and application of
federal statutory mandates."146 On a deeper level, however, there is a
significant difference between the two types of analysis. The formu-
lation of federal common law permits a court to take a much broader
view, focusing its attention on the relationship between the overall
policies underlying the regulatory scheme and the specific facts
before the court.1
47
Using the broad legislative purpose to determine the governing
rule, a federal court may embrace a state law if it will "best effectu-
ate the federal policy. 1 48 An analysis of ERISA's legislative scheme
demonstrates that a court should adopt the rule embodied in the
Suastez decision as the governing federal rule. ERISA's primary ob-
jective was to protect against illusory benefits. The Suastez rule will
further this goal by ensuring that vacation benefit promises are
meaningful to workers. The vesting of vacation benefits will confer
upon a worker a nonforfeitable right to a portion of his vacation
benefit as he discharges his daily assignments. The enactment of
ERISA demonstrates the need for legal requirements compelling em-
ployers to grant such vested benefits. Without these requirements, an
employer is free to make illusory promises in place of providing ad-
ditional compensation which the employee has bargained for and is
entitled to receive.
Moreover, in creating this federal rule, it is important to focus
on the specific findings of the Suastez case. The rule logically derives
from a particular conception of vacation pay which is the modern
and best view. The underlying issue which was resolved in this case
was whether a fringe benefit, such as vacation pay, is payment for
past services or is an inducement for future services. Vacation pay
was traditionally viewed as payment for future services which pro-
vided a worker with a short interval of complete rest to ensure his
continued productivity. However, today it is a benefit that is so
closely linked to wages in the minds of employees that the judiciary
should consider this benefit as payment for past services already
completed. Once this view of vacation pay is accepted, a court has no
choice but to require that vacation pay, like wages, vest immediately
146. Id. at 323.
147. See Note, supra note 140, at 1522.
148. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 951 (1964) (quoting Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).
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as the services are rendered.
Before fully accepting the Suastez decision, it may be argued
that the rule does not meet one important policy objective of
ERISA-the encouragement of the adoption and growth of benefit
plans. In fact, there is a possibility that Congress purposely ex-
empted welfare plans from vesting requirements to prevent imposing
a costly regulation which would discourage benefit coverage. None-
theless, in this case such a concern is not applicable. It is doubtful
that employers will wholly eliminate their vacation pay policies be-
cause this type of deferred compensation arrangement has become an
integral part of employment in this country. The costs of employee
dissatisfaction, if these plans were eliminated, would strongly deter
employers from abolishing these desired policies.
Although it appears that the formulation of federal common law
to uphold the Suastez decision is the same result that may be arrived
at by narrowing the scope of preemption, there are different implica-
tions. First, a court is likely to arrive at a more reasoned conclusion
when it formulates federal common law than when it liberally inter-
prets ERISA's preemption section. The creation of a federal rule
results from a careful analysis of specific facts of vacation pay vest-
ing, rather than an analysis of historical and often nebulous congres-
sional intent concerning the scope of preemption. Moreover, often
section 514 analysis requires a court to distort the meaning of
ERISA's preemptive scope in order to reach an equitable result. Sec-
ondly, the creation of federal common law requiring immediate vest-
ing of vacation benefits represents a very narrow decision which ap-
plies uniformly and only to vacation benefits. On the other hand, if a
court found that such a vesting regulation falls outside the scope of
section 514, each state would be free to impose elaborate vesting
schedules on employee welfare plans-which would be very costly
and clearly counterproductive to ERISA's legislative program.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is certain that Congress intended through the enactment of
ERISA to regulate the entire field of employee benefit plans. It is
also certain that by including section 514, Congress intended that
states would be prohibited from regulating any portion of these
plans. The Suastez decision potentially interferes with this clear leg-
islative mandate. Although there are valid arguments showing that
such interference does not occur, in the end such a finding must fail
because it is the role of the legislature and not the judiciary to nar-
row the scope of preemption.
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This conclusion, however, does not mean that courts are power-
less to act. Although a federal court has found the Suastez decision
to be preempted by ERISA, it has the authority to formulate a fed-
eral rule governing the vesting of vacation pay. That rule should
adopt the vesting requirement embodied in the Suastez decision.
Resolution of the issue of whether a state has authority to regu-
late vacation vesting has significant ramifications for all employee
non-wage benefit plans. The underlying policy question concerns the
relative power of the states and the federal government to substan-
tially govern employee benefit plans. It appears that until Congress
acts to allow states to regulate in this area or acts to address the issue
of welfare benefit vesting on a national level, it will be the role of the
courts to formulate vesting rules based on the underlying policies of
ERISA's regulatory program.
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